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Summary
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon led to the closing the following day of 50 of the nearly 260 U.S. embassies
and consulates worldwide. A week later, however, all U.S. facilities were open for
business. Additionally, three embassies – in Pakistan, Yemen, and Turkmenistan –
allowed for voluntary evacuations immediately after the attack.  In the months prior
to the attack, travel warnings were issued and embassies were put on high alert as
Osama bin Laden had issued vague, but credible, threats against Americans and
American interests around the world.
Earlier this year, Secretary of State Colin Powell had testified before Congress
that embassy security is among his highest priorities.  He made the case that the U.S.
government owes State Department personnel on the front lines of diplomacy the
same high level of tools and security given to our military on the front lines.  The
Administration requested a total of $1.3 billion for embassy security and worldwide
security upgrades for FY2002.  The House concurred; the Senate passed a total of
$1.07 billion.
Throughout the summer 2001, the United States received credible threats against
American embassies and tourists overseas.  The Department of State responded by
issuing a worldwide travel warning to American citizens and cancelling  Independence
Day celebrations at American overseas facilities.  
In June 2000 the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan was put on full alert after
receiving “credible evidence” that Osama bin Laden followers were planning to attack
it.  Additionally, the Department of State advised American travelers to be mindful
of the August 7th anniversary of the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania.  Then, in September 2000, terrorists attacked the U.S.S. Cole Navy
destroyer. 
The August 7, 1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
resulted in a number of actions by the Administration and Congress.  With evidence
that bin Laden was involved in the attacks, the Administration, on July 4, 1999,
imposed sanctions on the Taliban government because it refused to cooperate in his
arrest.  In October 1999, the UN Security Council imposed limited sanctions on the
Taliban, and in August 2000 both the United States and Russia agreed to work
together to tighten the sanctions. 
Embassy security budget ramifications of the 1998 bombings continue.  In
November 1999, Congress expanded authority  for State’s FY2000 through FY2004
expenditures on overseas security within the Embassy Security, Construction and
Maintenance (ESCM) account to $900 million annually, in addition to security funds
in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account (D&CP) for FY2000-FY2004
(P.L. 106-113). 
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Embassy Security:
Background, Funding, and the Budget
Background
U.S. embassy security needs have evolved and expanded over recent decades.
During the 1950s, U.S. embassies were intentionally grand and highly visible to
showcase the American way of life and promote democracy.  It was believed then that
by placing embassies in the center of foreign cities, U.S. diplomats and services would
be more accessible and inviting to Americans, as well as local officials and residents.
Throughout the 1960s, Vietnam-related demonstrations and attacks at embassies,
mostly involving destruction of property, were on the rise; and in 1965 the United
States witnessed the dawning of a new level of violence when 3 embassy employees
were killed in the U.S. embassy in Saigon.  The 1970s were marked by frequent
terrorist attacks on embassies; the decade ended with the  hostage taking in Tehran
in 1979. 
In response to the increasing frequency and seriousness of incidents, the State
Department, with congressional support, initiated the Security Enhancement Program
(SEP) in August 1980.  The object of SEP was to improve protection of mission
personnel, U.S. government property, and classified information at posts where the
foreign government was unwilling or unable to provide effective protection.  Experts
were sent abroad to assess certain embassy security needs where a high, medium, or
low threat of mob violence had been determined, and then recommend improvements.
The issue of embassy security again gained focus and urgency after the bombing
of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon in April 1983, the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut in October 1983, and the bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut
in September 1984.  These incidents awakened the United States to the destructive
power of explosive-laden trucks and car bombs.
 The bombings resulted in the passage of the 1984 Act to Combat International
Terrorism (P.L. 98-533), which authorized reward payments for information leading
to the arrest of individuals involved in terrorist acts against Americans or American
property and $356.3 million for enhanced embassy security. 
Also in the wake of the three Beirut bombings, Secretary of State George P.
Shultz formed a commission–the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security–headed by
Retired Admiral Bobby Inman, which reported its recommendations (sometimes
referred to as the Inman report) in June 1985.1  The findings and recommendations,
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of State, June 1985.
2 Telephone conversation with Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of State, September
20, 2001.
as modified by subsequent reviews, continue to be the standards (often referred to as
the Inman standards) for today’s security measures.  
Some of the recommendations by the Inman Panel included (1) a reorganization
of the offices in the Department of State that are primarily responsible for security and
counter-terrorism and consolidation of operational security offices into a new bureau
for Diplomatic Security; (2) improvements in State’s protective intelligence, threat
analysis, and alerting procedures; (3) improvements in the Department’s training of
Foreign Service personnel and dependents to deal more effectively with terrorist
threats; (4) improvements in contingency planning at the posts; (5) assigning Marine
Security Guard detachments to all highly sensitive posts; (6) revising the Diplomatic
Security Service physical security standards; (7) pursuing a substantial building
program to correct security deficiencies; and (8) initiating a capital budgeting
procedure to avoid security improvement delays due to budgetary reasons.  The panel
also offered a number of classified recommendations.
Contrary to widespread belief, the report specifically did not recommend a 100
foot setback for embassies and 9 foot walls–frequently cited as Inman standards.
These criteria resulted from the magnitude of the Beirut bombs and the measures that
would have protected those facilities at the time.  The Inman panel set in motion the
focus on security from which the current standards evolved.
Following the Advisory Panel report, Congress took up the issue of international
terrorism and security and passed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism
Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399).  This Act became the permanent authorization (often
duplicated by the biannual foreign relations authorization act) for embassy
construction and security programs.
In 1985, the Advisory panel identified 126 facilities with inadequate security, 50
of them consulates.  As of September 1, 1998, 49 facilities have been built or
enhanced to meet new security standards.  (As of September 2001, the Administration
estimates that about 80% of U.S. overseas facilities do not meet minimum security
requirements.)2
Immediately following the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998,
there was disagreement between the Department of State and Capitol Hill over
primary responsibility for under funding embassy security over the years.  Since then,
Congress has sought even greater funding levels that the Clinton Administration for
overseas security purposes.  At the same time, State Department experts are
somewhat conflicted between wanting to maintain embassy visibility and accessibility
overseas, while trying to increase setbacks and barriers which would prohibit terrorist
actions.
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In February, 1999, Secretary of State Albright announced the selection of the
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) chaired by Lewis Kaden.  The panel
reported its recommendations in November 19993, including: 1) improving windows
and barriers, warning systems, and emergency response training; 2) creating an
interagency committee to determine the right size and locations for U.S. overseas
presence; and 3) establishing an Overseas Facilities Authority (OFA) to manage the
building, maintenance, and renovation of American overseas facilities.
In an August 3, 2000 press conference, Secretary Albright responded to a
question regarding lack of success in capturing bin Laden: “We [will] never forget the
victims of those bombings...We will continue to do what we must in terms of
sanctions and do what we can generally with our friends and allies to try to hunt down
the terrorists.  Their day will come, and there is no statute of limitations and we will
pursue them as necessary.”4
Slightly more than a year later, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with more than 6,000 dead, the United
States is now leading a worldwide effort to end terrorism once and for all.
Determining Embassy Security Needs
The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa in August 1998 reinforced the
belief that it is impossible to attain 100% security.  Even though the embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam did not meet Inman standards, the size of the blasts
underscored the vulnerabilities of major buildings in densely populated areas.  After
the attacks, a number of Administration officials asserted that as bombs get bigger and
more sophisticated, standards will need to be continually revised, but there can be no
guarantees for complete security overseas.  
Every U.S.  overseas post goes through a threat assessment process authorized
by the Diplomatic Security Act of 1986.  The threat level associated with each post
is an evaluation of threat levels for a particular time period and can be changed as
events occur or when a new assessment is deemed necessary.  The four threat level
categories are: critical, high, medium, and low.  Each post is given a threat level that
helps the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service allocate resources for
overseas security.  Given that the assessed threat levels of the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania were medium to low, the State Department is reviewing its
methodology for evaluating threat levels and the significance the Administration
places on threat assessments in its allocation of security resources.  According to
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4, 1998.
Secretary of State Albright, “After the Africa bombings, we can no longer consider
any post a low threat one.”5
Currently, security resource needs of each post are a reflection of the potential
for terrorist activity or unrest within a particular country,  and other factors such as
the physical location of the facility (i.e., in a city, in a rural area, close to a busy street,
set far back from any streets, etc.).  Security determinations are made after
consultation among State’s Office of Diplomatic Security, Office of Foreign Buildings
Operations, and the embassy security officer in the overseas facility.  Responsibility
for requesting resources for overseas post security ultimately rests with the Secretary
of State, upon receiving recommendations from the Assistant Secretary of Diplomatic
Security and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Foreign Buildings in the Bureau of
Administration. 
Procedures for Dealing with Terrorist Threats
One problem for U.S. security personnel is deciding how to respond to threats
against U.S. facilities and personnel.  Currently, according to State Department
officials, 10 - 12 threats are aimed at U.S. overseas posts each day.  That amounts to
approximately 3,000 to 4,000 threats handled each year by the Department of State.
There is no one set procedure to handle all threats made against American
overseas facilities and staff.  The U.S. response might differ depending on the country,
the type of facility (an embassy, consulate, or living quarters), and whether the threat
comes from a walk-in or phone call.  Nevertheless, State Department officials are
quick to point out that all threats are taken seriously.  
Generally, procedures include a first level response in which the resident security
officer and the regional officer of a facility confer with officials in Washington to
discuss the credibility of the threat.  Subsequent discussions determine whether the
local post can handle the threat alone or whether a greater response is warranted.
Normally, the regional security officer seeks information from the local police to assist
in determining the credibility and the nature of the threat.  U.S. intelligence also tries
to verify the significance of the threat.  Some of the actions that the Chief of Mission
can take include:  closing surrounding streets (with local police concurrence), putting
up concrete barriers, temporarily reducing staff size in the building, and evacuating
all personnel from the area or country.  State Department officials in Washington with
responsibility for security say that Administration officials would not take any action
against a perceived credible threat without first consulting with the Chief of Mission.6
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History of Congressional Action on
Embassy Security Funding
Congress provides the bulk of funds for overseas facility and personnel security
in the Commerce, Justice, State (CJS)appropriations for State’s Security and
Maintenance of U.S. Missions7, Diplomatic Security, and regional bureau accounts.
(See Table 1 and Table 2.)  Smaller amounts are contained in the Foreign Operations
appropriations (for U.S. Agency For International Development security funding, for
example) and Department of Defense appropriations (for salaries and expenses and
some housing funds for the Marine guards stationed at the embassies).  
In 1980 the State Department had estimated SEP funding needs for the next five
years to be $191 million.  Congress appropriated a total of $136.3 million from
FY1980 - FY1984 for the program.   
Following the 1983/84 Beirut attacks, President Reagan submitted a request for
a new supplemental appropriation of $110.2 million only for FY1985.  This reportedly
was the difference between the State Department’s own budget request and that
agreed to by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for submission to
Congress in the FY1985 President’s budget.  The $110.2 million was  part of a larger
authorization request–the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism (P.L. 98-533)
that, among other things, included $356.3 million program for increased security for
U.S. diplomatic missions overseas.  The supplemental request was in addition to funds
already set aside in 1984 for the SEP.
The Inman study, completed in June 1985, recommended $3.5 billion to meet
security needs overseas.  A subsequent landmark authorization measure, the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399) became the basic
authorization for embassy construction and security programs that are also authorized
by the biannual foreign relations authorization act.   Congress authorized $2.1 billion
in that Act and, according to State Department officials, it has appropriated $1.2
billion for Inman-related embassy security measures.  (At the same time, State
Department officials acknowledge that it is impossible to identify what past funding
is or is not linked to the Inman recommendations.) 8  
In contrast, as shown in Table 1 and Table 2 below, the Administration
requested $5.8 billion for security within several different State Department accounts
for security from FY1987 (the first post Inman appropriation) to FY1998, while
Congress  appropriated $5.0 billion (excluding any rescissions of unused end-of-year
funds) over the same time period.  By themselves, these  reductions (an average of
$66.7 million annually) from the Department’s total requests for security funds do not
appear to support the implication by some critics that Congress has failed to support
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the Inman panel’s recommendations, especially since the cuts were often made for
specific reasons related to construction delays or other practical considerations.
Rather, it would appear that the State Department has not asked for funds in the
magnitude necessary to implement Inman recommendations, if more than the
appropriated $5 billion was necessary.  Furthermore, in at least two years–FY1995
and FY1996–Congress rescinded a combined total of nearly $100 million of
unobligated funds in State’s Security and Maintenance of Overseas Missions account.
This suggests that the Department was not spending all the appropriations that it did
receive, although some lack of spending may be attributable to such factors as delays
in construction or in negotiating the purchase of property.
Neither the State Department nor congressional appropriators had highlighted
embassy security upgrade programs in budgets during the early 1990s.  According to
State Department budget requests and appropriations conference reports between
FY1985 and the embassy bombings of August 1998, only two CJS conference reports
had mentioned new security requirements.  The State Department budget request
mentioned “new diplomatic security funds” only for the FY1987 budget request.
Furthermore, neither the Administration’s budget requests nor the appropriations
reports over the last 12 years connect security funding to the Inman
recommendations.
In FY1996-FY1997, in addition to security funding in the Diplomatic Security
account and in the Security and Maintenance of U.S. Missions account, and without
a request from the Administration for such security funds, Congress earmarked funds
in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account for security–$11.6 million in
FY1996 and $23.7 million for FY1997.  Following Congress’ lead, the Administration
requested in its FY1998 budget $23.7 million for security funds in the Diplomatic and
Consular Affairs Program account. 
On September 22, 1998, the President submitted to Congress a request for an
FY1998 emergency supplemental appropriation amounting to $1.8 billion to address
immediate expenses resulting from the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and
improve U.S. security and antiterrorism efforts worldwide.  State Department officials
claimed that since the bills from the August 1998 bombings were paid with FY1998
appropriations and since Department officials wanted to avoid being in violation of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the funding needed
to be in the form of an FY1998 emergency supplemental (as opposed to adjusting
FY1999 appropriations, which would exceed FY1999 spending caps).  The
Administration also pointed out that any increased hiring for improved worldwide
embassy security as a result of an FY1998 supplemental would increase the State
Department out year budget needs beginning in FY2000.
Of the amended $1.9 billion in the enacted emergency supplemental (P.L. 105-
277), $1.56 billion came within the foreign affairs 150 budget account for the
Department of State.  The levels Congress enacted in the omnibus appropriation
emergency supplemental provisions to the Department of State follow:
! Congress provided $790.8 million for the Diplomatic and Consular
Programs Account, $748 million for reestablishing embassy functions
in Kenya and Tanzania and for security improvements overseas, as
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requested.  Beyond the P$25.7 million for antiterrorism activities,
which can be released only after the President declares an emergency.
! Congress provided $677.5 million in the Security and Maintenance
Account primarily for rebuilding or relocating the embassy facilities
in Kenya and Tanzania.
! In the omnibus budget act, Congress provided $12 million for the
Salaries and Expenses Account for security improvements and for a
security review panel.
! Congress agreed to the $12.9 million requested for the Emergencies
in the Diplomatic and Consular Affairs Account for emergency
expenditures related to the embassy bombings, including expenses for
evacuations, rewards, and medical needs of employees.
! Congress provided $1 million for State’s Office of Inspector
General, as requested, to enable the Inspector General to carry out
additional security oversight and inspections.
In the omnibus appropriation for FY1999 (H.R. 4328/P.L. 105-277),9 Congress
provided regular appropriations of $403.6 million for the Security and Maintenance
account10 and $25.7 million (within the supplemental provisions) in the Diplomatic
and Consular Programs account for overseas security.  Congress did not set
appropriation levels for Diplomatic Security, as it is not a specific line item in the
budget. 
During the early consideration of the FY2000 State Department budget request,
Congress criticized the Administration for requesting inadequate funds (a total of
$303 million) for worldwide security upgrades. The Administration had testified that
much of the emergency supplemental funds was still in the pipeline to be spent on
security needs.  On November 19, 1999, after the Administration had resubmitted its
request increasing security funding, Congress approved the FY2000 State Department
appropriation (H.R. 3421)11 which included a total of $568 million specifically for
overseas security.  State’s FY2000 Diplomatic and Consular Programs account
included $254 million for worldwide security upgrades, and the Embassy Security,
Construction and Maintenance (ESCM) account contained $313.6 million for
worldwide security upgrades. Some additional funds were also available in other
accounts for overseas security.
Congress also passed the Foreign Relations Authorization bill (H.R. 3427),
which authorizes $900 million for overseas security from FY2000 through FY2004–a
total of $4.5 billion.  For comparison, the Crowe Accountability Review Board report
(submitted in January 1999) recommended $1.4 billion be spent annually over the next
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ten years.   Congress increased security funding for State in FY2001 to a total of
$1.07 billion–$661.2 million in Embassy, Security, Construction, and Maintenance,
and $409.1 million in Diplomatic and Consular Programs.
The FY2002 Budget Request for Embassy Security
The Bush Administration FY2002 State Department budget request emphasized
three goals:  improving information technology, embassy security and construction,
and additional hiring of Foreign and Civil Service, as well as security personnel.  Each
of these priorities would contribute to improved security at Department facilities
around the world.  The overall State Department budget request for FY2002
represents a 13% increase over the FY2001 enacted level.  For specific embassy
security accounts, the request consists of $487.7 million within the Diplomatic and
Consular Programs account and $816 million within the Embassy, Security,
Construction, and Maintenance account.  The House agrees with the Administration
request, while the Senate passed $409.4 million within the Diplomatic and Consular
Programs account and $661.6 million for the Embassy, Security, Construction, and
Maintenance account.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001 (P.L.
107-38).  This law includes $390,000 for the Diplomatic and Consular Programs
account, $7.5 million for the Capital Investment Fund (for emergency
communications technology, and $41 million for the Emergencies in the Diplomatic
and Consular Service account, largely for evacuations and reward money to help
apprehend terrorists.
Accountability Review Boards
Prompted by the August 1998 embassy bombings, Secretary of State Madeline
K. Albright and CIA Director George Tenet appointed an accountability review
board, required by law after such fatal terrorist attacks, headed by retired Admiral
William J. Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The report,
submitted in early January 1999, cited Administration agencies and Congress as
sharing the responsibility for embassies being inadequately prepared for terrorist
attacks.  The report recommended that the U.S. government spend $1.4 billion a year
over 10 years to improve security at U.S. overseas facilities.  Numerous specific
recommendations in the report came under three basic categories: 1) enhancement of
work place security; 2) improvement of crisis management systems and procedures;
and 3) improvement of intelligence and information sharing and assessment.12
Additionally, the Secretary of State established the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel
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on February 23, 1999 to make recommendations on the organization of U.S. overseas
posts.
In February 1999, Secretary of State Albright announced the establishment of
the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) chaired by private sector lawyer,
Lewis B. Kaden.  Within America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, OPAP
reported  in November 1999 its nine general recommendations (which included
several sub-recommendations):
! Continue to implement the Accountability Review Boards’ (ARB)
recommendations of upgrading windows, barriers, training of
personnel, and security officers.  Also, reinforce lines of
accountability and responsibility;
! Establish by Executive order a new and permanent Interagency
Overseas Presence Committee to determine the optimal size, mix of
expertise, and location of America’s facilities abroad to maximize
foreign policy effectiveness and minimize personnel risk;
! Create a new government-chartered corporation–an Overseas
Facilities Authority (OFA)–to be responsible for building, renovating,
maintaining, and managing the Federal government’s civilian
overseas offices and residences by combining the best practices of the
private sector and government;
! Develop a comprehensive human resources strategy which would
include improving the quality of life for overseas employees, expand
language, management, and leadership training, and improve
recruiting and promotion processes;
! Immediately upgrade State Department’s information technology;
! Reinforce and expand consular services and allow the Bureau of
Consular Affairs to reinvest its revenue;
! Review administrative services overseas–regionalize and upgrade
some functions and assign a bigger role to foreign nationals;
! Enhance and refocus the role of the Ambassador; require mission
statements and budgets, and encourage cross-agency/interdisciplinary
teams;
! The President should establish an implementation mechanism by
Executive order and appoint a “Coordinator for Overseas Presence
Reform.”  Form a partnership between the Administration and
Congressional leaders to reshape U.S. overseas presence.
Some of these issues were discussed in foreign relations authorization legislation
(H.R. 1646/S.1401) that Congress is considering.
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Table 1.  State Department Security Appropriations and Requests, FY1992-2002
(in millions of dollars; numbers in parentheses are Administration requests)
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Source: United States Department of State, Congressional Presentations, FY1986-FY1999 and appropriations reports.
1. Includes regular appropriations and an emergency supplemental (P.L. 105-277) which were passed October 21, 1999. Administration Request.  n.a.= not available.
2.  Estimate.
3. $30 million in unobligated balances in the Security and Maintenance account available in FY1995 were rescinded pursuant to the FY1995 Supplemental and Rescissions Act (P.L. 104-19).
4. $65.2 million in unobligated balances in the Security and Maintenance account available in FY1996 were rescinded pursuant to the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations for FY1996 (P.L. 104-134).
5. Construction Security Account, primarily security against infiltration at construction sites, was transferred to Acquisition and Maintenance of U.S. Missions Account in FY1991.
6. Does not include Border Security accounts funded by fees from Machine Readable Visas for diplomatic security personnel, terrorism and crime, and visa fraud investigations. Totals are:  FY1996–$1.5
million, FY1997–$13.3 million, FY1998–$12.5 million, FY1999 request–$14.9 million, FY2000–$17,365, FY2001–$18,523, and FY2002 request–$19,600. 
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Table 2.  Summary of State Department Regional Bureau Security Funding, FY1992-2002
(in Millions of Dollars; numbers in parentheses are Administration requests)









































































































































































Source: United States Department of State, Congressional Presentations, FY1990-FY1999 and appropriations reports.
1. Estimate.
2. Administration Request.
n.a. = not available
